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Casenotes

Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District: School District Remains Afloat in
Title IX Litigation Floodwater
In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,1 the United
States Supreme Court held that a school district could not be held liable
under Title IX for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student without
actual notice and deliberate indifference. 2 In a five to four decision, the
Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the school district.'

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In Gebser the Court considered the circumstances that warrant
imposing liability on a school district for sexual harassment in violation
of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX"). 4 Frank
Waldrop, a teacher at Lago Vista's high school, was involved in a sexual
relationship with one of his students, Alida Gebser. Waldrop first met
Gebser when she was a thirteen-year-old student in an eighth-grade

1. 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
2. Id. at 2000.
3. Id. The majority consisted of Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Chief
Justice Rehnquist; Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented. Id. at 1992.

4. Id. at 1993.
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class that his wife taught. Ironically, it was Waldrop's wife who referred
Gebser to Waldrop's high school discussion group. A relationship
ensued, and by the time Gebser was fifteen years old, what started out
as sexually suggestive and flattering comments progressed into frequent
consensual sexual relations.5 Eventually, a police officer arrested
Waldrop after discovering the couple engaging in sexual intercourse.
Although school officials had received complaints that Waldrop had often
made sexually suggestive comments to students, they were unaware of
the sexual relationship until Waldrop's arrest. Subsequently, the high
school terminated his employment, and the Texas Education Agency
revoked his teaching license.6
Gebser and her mother filed a sexual harassment suit against the
school district under Title IX, seeking compensatory and punitive
damages.' The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
school district, and Gebser appealed, arguing that school districts can be
liable on agency principles when teachers use their authority to abuse
students ("teacher-student harassment").' The circuit court affirmed,
citing prior case law that rejected theories of strict liability and
constructive notice.9 The court also expressed its concern that commonlaw agency theories would impute vicarious liability to school boards for
all teacher-student harassment."° For these reasons, the circuit court
refused to recognize strict or vicarious liability for a Title IX sexual
harassment violation absent a school board's actual knowledge."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address when a school
district could be held liable for damages under Title IX for sexual
harassment of a student by a teacher. In a five to four decision, the
Court affirmed. 2 The Court held that Title IX does not authorize
damages against a district unless a school official, having the authority
to address unlawful discrimination and the power to take corrective
measures, has actual knowledge of the discrimination and fails to take
adequate action to end it.' 3

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
1996)).
10.
11.
12.
13.

Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223, 1224-25 (5th Cir. 1997).
Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1993.
Id.
Doe, 106 F.3d at 1225.
Id. (referring to Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 402 (5th Cir.
Id. at 1226.
Id.
Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 2000.
Id. at 1999.
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II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Title IX provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 4
The statute is
administratively enforced by the Office of Civil Rights ("OCR"), a
division of the federal Department of Education. 5 Originally, Title IX
deterred discrimination only administratively through the threat of
withdrawal of federal funds, 6 but judicial construction has since
transformed it into a limited, yet powerful, weapon for obtaining private
damages as well.
The Supreme Court launched this trend in Cannon v. University of
Chicago.'7 Cannon, a female student, was denied admission to two
universities because of her sex. The lower courts determined that Title
IX contained no express private right of action and declined to infer
one.'1
However, the Supreme Court, examining legislative intent
underlying Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and Title
IX,' 9 determined that Congress expected Title IX to contain private
remedies for intentional discrimination because Congress had not
objected to court interpretations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ("Title VI") that found an implied private remedy.2" The Court
stated that Congress patterned Title IX after Title VI by inserting the
word "sex" in the place of Title VI's language protecting classes based on
race, color, and national origin.2
When Title IX was enacted, the
language in Title VI concerning the protected
classes had already been
22
interpreted to provide a private remedy.

14. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
15. Trudy Saunders Bredthauer, Twenty-Five Years Under Title IX: Have We Made
Progress?, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1107, 1108 (1998).
16. Id. at 1108.
17. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
18. Id. at 683.
19. Id. at 694-704. Title VII provides that it is unlawful for employers to "fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
...because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (1994).
20. Id. at 696-98. Title VI provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participating in, be denied the

benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
21.
22.

Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-95.
Id. at 696.
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The expansion of remedies continued in Franklinv. Gwinnett County
Public Schools,23 when the Court, without construing the standard for
a funded entity's liability, addressed the issue of the appropriateness of
monetary damages in an implied private right of action under Title
IX. 24

Christine Franklin, a student, was subjected to sexually oriented

conversations and coercive sexual intercourse by one of her teachers.
When school administrators became aware of this teacher-student
harassment, they failed to take action sufficient to stop the harassment
and also discouraged Franklin from pressing charges. The teacher
resigned, and the school closed its investigation. 25 The district court
determined that Title IX did not provide for monetary damages and
subsequently dismissed the complaint.2 6 On appeal, the Supreme Court
reviewed only the damages issue. It relied upon a presumption that all
appropriate remedies are available unless Congress expressly precluded
them." The Court also examined the legislative history of Title IX and
determined that Congress did not intend to limit the types of remedies
available.28 The Court held that monetary damages, including recovery
for emotional distress, are available, at least for intentional violations of
Title

IX. 29

Although Franklin established a damages remedy, it

provided no guidance concerning the standards governing a school
district's liability for actionable harassment by an employee. Before
Gebser, the lower courts had devised several standards including strict
liability, constructive notice, and actual notice.
In Bolon v. Rolla Public Schools, ° the district court adopted a strict
liability approach.31 Relying on a portion of the Franklin opinion that
equated supervisor-employee sexual harassment (of the type prohibited
by Title VII) to the teacher-student sexual harassment at issue, the
court imputed liability to the school district for intentional sexual
discrimination by a teacher regardless of whether the school district was
aware of the discrimination.3 2 The court determined that strict liability
was necessary if Title IX was to have any effect.3 3 It characterized the
constructive notice standard as unworkable because teacher-student

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

503 U.S. 60 (1992).
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 63-64.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 76.
917 F. Supp. 1423 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
Id. at 1429.
Id. at 1428.
Id. at 1429.
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harassment is inherently clandestine, making the harassment difficult
to detect, yet easy to ignore. 4
Taking a different view of the standard for entity liability under Title
IX, the Eighth Circuit applied a constructive notice standard in Kinman
v. Omaha Public School District.5 In Kinman a teacher initiated a
sexual relationship with one of her students. During an investigation
into the relationship, the teacher voluntarily took lie detector tests that
indicated deception. Despite this evidence and additional allegations
that the relationship had continued, the school took no further action.36
The court of appeals looked to Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 7 and
other Title VII cases for guidance in its quest for an appropriate Title IX
school liability standard, because it had only recently held that Title VII
standards were applicable to Title IX actions.3 " The court held the
constructive notice standard was appropriate for intentional teacherstudent sexual harassment cases because the Meritor opinion imputed
liability to the employer, under agency principles, for the discriminatory
acts of its employees. 39 The case was remanded to determine if the
school had constructive knowledge of the relationship at any point
during the investigation.4 °
The actual knowledge standard was articulated by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Rosa H. v. San Elizario Independent School
District. In Rosa H. a school's karate teacher initiated a sexual
relationship with one of his students. The court of appeals was not
persuaded that Franklinimplied a vicarious liability standard whenever
intentional sexual harassment is established.4 2 In addition, the plain
language of Title IX did not suggest that school districts assumed
liability according to agency theories.43 Whereas Title VII makes an
explicit reference to agents of employers, the court observed that Title
IX imposes liability only for the conduct of the actual recipient of federal
34. Id.
35.
36.
37.

94 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 465-66.
477 U.S. 57 (1986). Meritor was significant because it established that sexual

harassment claims are not limited to cases when employment advancement is dependent
on the granting of sexual favors. Id. at 65. The creation of a "hostile environment" by
conduct that either interferes with job performance or results in an intimidating or
offensive atmosphere is sufficient to establish a Title VII claim. Id.
38. Kinman, 94 F.3d at 469 (referring to Brine v. University of Iowa, 90 F.3d 271, 27576 (8th Cir. 1996)).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997).
42. Id. at 654.
43. Id.
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funds." The court concluded that Title IX was not enacted to impose
unlimited liability on federally-funded schools.45 After rejecting the
agency and constructive notice theories, the court held that school
district liability hinges on whether high-level officials had actual notice
and, despite that notice, failed to correct the problem.46
III.

RATIONALE OF THE COURT

In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court held that a school district
could not be liable for damages under Title IX for teacher-student sexual
harassment without actual notice and deliberate indifference.47 In
doing so, the Court rejected the strict liability and constructive notice
standards applied by the lower courts.48
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, examined Gebser's
contention that Lago Vista was liable for Waldrop's conduct under strict
liability or constructive notice standards.4 9 Gebser relied on a Sexual
Harassment Policy Guidance ("Guidance") issued by the OCR which
recommended school district liability for teacher-student sexual
harassment "irrespective of whether school district officials had any
knowledge of the harassment and irrespective of their response upon
becoming aware."5 ° The Court rejected the Guidance, offering two
reasons why Franklin's citation of Meritor, the Title VII decision
directing the application of agency principles, did not determine that
respondeat superior or constructive notice liability is permissible under
Title IX.51 First, the school district's liability in Franklin was based on
evidence of actual knowledge, not strict liability or constructive
knowledge.52 Second, the rationale of Meritor could not apply to Title
IX because Title IX lacked the "agency" language of Title VII.53
Because Congress had not spoken on strict liability, the Court had
some flexibility to determine appropriate standards. 4 The Court
observed that while the purpose of Title VII is to remedy past discrimination by making victims whole, the purpose of Title IX is to protect

44. Id.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 656.
Id. at 658.
Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 2000.
Id. at 1997.
Id. at 1993-99.
Id. at 1995.
Id. at 1995-96.
Id.
Id. at 1996.
Id.
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individuals from discrimination by recipients of federal funds.55
Originally, the only remedy Title IX offered was injunctive and equitable
relief.16 The Court concluded that imposing liability without actual
notice would frustrate Title IX's purpose.5 7 Allowing damages in all
cases of teacher-student sexual harassment would, as a practical matter,
require school boards to acquiesce in unlimited liability as the price of
federal funding simply by agreeing not to discriminate based on sex.58
The majority believed that Congress could not have desired this
result."9
The Court also treated the administrative agency's method of
enforcement as suggesting a notice requirement." When a sexual
harassment situation occurs under Title IX, the OCR may impose
sanctions (suspending or terminating fund disbursement) only after it
determines that the fund recipient will not voluntarily comply with Title
IX following notification of its potential violation.6' The central
purpose of such notice, the Court believed, is to provide the recipient
with an opportunity to take appropriate action to rectify the violation
If liability is imputed to a
before enforcement proceedings begin.
school district before it has actual knowledge of teacher-student
harassment, the school has no opportunity to take corrective measures
to end the harassment and to comply with the statute. 63 A judiciallyimplied enforcement system that contradicts the express legislative
enforcement system would be "unsound."64
The Court then considered who the appropriate person to receive
notice on behalf of the district is and what constitutes deliberate
indifference by the district after receiving such notice.6 5 According to
the Court, an appropriate person is an official with authority to initiate
corrective measures to end the discrimination.6 6 The Court determined
that an inappropriate response that amounts to deliberate indifference
must be an official decision by the district to take no action to end the

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

1997.
1998.
1998-99.
1998.
1999.
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discrimination. 67 A lower standard would impute liability to the
district for independent actions of employees, instead of intentional
official actions plainly attributable to fund recipients.68
Although the Court recognized that sexual harassment of students is
a frequent and unfortunate reality in our society, Gebser had no recourse
under Title IX.69 However, the Court pointed out that its affirmation
of the judgment in favor of the school district did not prevent victims of
teacher-student sexual harassment from seeking damages from the
school or teacher under relevant state law.7" The Court concluded that,
until Congress specifically addresses this issue, it was unwilling to
impose strict liability or constructive notice standards as a matter of
federal law.7"
Justice Stevens, in a dissent joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, stated that the majority's conclusion actually contradicts the
purposes of Title IX.72 Justice Stevens observed that Franklin held, at
least implicitly, that teacher-student sexual harassment was a violation
of a school district's duty to not discriminate, a duty the district assumes
in exchange for federal funds, and that recovery of damages was
appropriate.73 Because Waldrop's conduct was intentional and occurred
while exercising authority over Gebser, the school district should be
liable.74 To hold otherwise would contradict agency principles as well
as the OCR's Guidance imposing liability when a teacher abuses
authority by sexually harassing a student.75
Justice Stevens argued the purpose of Title IX liability is to induce
school boards to promulgate and enforce programs that will minimize
sexual harassment in schools receiving federal funds.76 Imposition of
liability in this case would further, not frustrate, the purposes behind
Title IX's enactment.77 Justice Stevens was concerned that the
majority's rule would give school boards the incentive to "insulate
themselves from knowledge" about teacher-student sexual harassment
to avoid damages.7"

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2000.

at 2001 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
at 2001-02.
at 2003.

75. Id.
76. Id. at 2004.
77. Id. at 2005.
78. Id. at 2004.
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Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, also dissented,
offering another approach derived from "the tort law doctrine of
avoidable consequences." 9 Justice Ginsburg argued that if a school
board had an effective policy for handling sexual harassment, it could
use such a policy as an affirmative defense to a Title IX liability
claim.8 ° In order to avoid liability, a school board would have the
burden of proving the plaintiff failed to utilize the school's preventive
and remedial programs, resulting in avoidable harm."1
IV. IMPLICATIONS

The Supreme Court's decision in Gebser is significant in several
respects. First, the decision specifically resolves the split of authority in
the lower courts by defining the standard of institutional liability for
teacher-student sexual harassment. 2
While Franklin has been
credited with opening "the floodgates for sexual harassment litigation
under Title IX,"" Gebser clearly rejects strict entity liability and
constructive knowledge standards and imposes the requirements of
actual knowledge and deliberate indifference." Lower courts will no
longer have to struggle with extrapolating policies from Title VII, a
substantive liability model the Court rejected. Congress must take action
in order to modify the Title IX liability standard the Court adopted. 5
Second, the decision will also ultimately affect the children in school
systems. Proponents of strict liability believe the agency theory is the
only way to require school districts to be as aggressive as possible in
preventing and discovering sexual harassment. 6
In contrast, a school cannot effectively serve a child in any capacity if
it is rendered financially bankrupt from unlimited damage awards.8 7
The grim reality is that schools will always attract people who become

79. Id. at 2007 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
80. Id. A similar affirmative defense was accepted by the Court in Title VII cases
alleging employer liability for a supervisor's creation of a hostile environment due to sexual
harassment. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998); Faragher v.
Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2293 (1998).
81. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 2007.
82. Id. at 2000.
83. Kaija Clark, School Liability and Compensation for Title IX Sexual Harassment
Violations by Teachers and Peers, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 358 (1998).
84. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 2000.
85. Id.
86. Richard Fossey & Todd A. Demitchell, "Let the Master Answer": Holding Schools
Vicariously Liable When Employees Sexually Abuse Children, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 575, 593-96
(1996).
87. Id. at 596.
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teachers in order to sexually abuse children. Because, after Franklin,
there are no fixed limits on damages, easily-met entity liability
standards could mean that the criminal conduct of a single individual
could devastate the ability of a school district to provide services for an
entire community.8
Finally, Gebser may also have implications for other issues arising out
of Title IX. For example, the Court will soon decide a case concerning
student-on-student sexual harassment.8 9 Because the standard of
"actual knowledge with deliberate indifference" is so hard to establish in
teacher-student sexual harassment cases, it will likewise be extremely
difficult for victims of student-on-student harassment to establish a Title
IX violation and seek compensation. There would then be no federal
damages remedy at all for such harassment because most courts have
held that individual officials, as opposed to institutions, are not subject
to Title IX liability.9 However, because the decision in Gebser did not
receive an overwhelming majority, the Court could establish that the
elements of the standard for district liability could more easily be met
in other Title IX liability situations.
RICHARD A. WELLER

88. Id.
89. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. granted,
1998 WL 663332 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1998) (No. 97-843).
90. 1 HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR., LITIGATING CIVIL RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES § 11.19 (Supp. 1997).

